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South Africa's first democratic elections represented a turning point in the country's history: it heralded
the end of white minority rule, and ushered in a majority black government. In certain respects the
process which unfolded from February 1990 to April 1994 also represented this country's
decolonisation. The achievement of a majority black government weighed most heavily on the
consciousness of all classes and races as almost 20 million stood in the queues to cast their votes for
the new South Africa.
The outcome of the election reflected this reality - a massive victory for the African National Congress
(ANC), nationally and regionally. Only in Natal and the Western Cape was the ANC denied electoral
victory and these regions are now referred to as the only "unliberated zones" of the country. Few
people will dispute, despite all the official denials, that the final outcome in Natal was the result of
a negotiated deal between the main parties. The Western Cape result, on the other hand, reflected the
real political divisions in that region. The victory of the National Party(NP) was secured by the
majority support it won from the Coloured population. In other regions, such as the Northern Cape
and the PWV, the NP also won a substantial amount of the Coloured vote. So far there has, not yet
been a thorough analysis of the reasons behind the NP's success in winning Coloured votes, or to pose
the issue slightly differently, why the ANC failed to win these votes. This paper aims to make some
contribution to this discussion from the point of view of an ANC activist who worked in a Coloured
constituency during the elections.
Coloured ANC members who have been active in the struggle since the early 1980s could not believe
that after so many years of successfully campaigning for boycotts of "dummy elections" that Coloureds
would now support the architects of apartheid. A Cosatu shop steward who played an active role in
the ANC's election campaign in the Western Cape despaired, explaining that perhaps Coloureds "are
just racist". Others have blamed the NP's racist campaign, the weaknesses of the ANC's campaign and
some accused the ANC of having lost the support in the Coloured areas which the United Democratic
Front(UDF) built in the 1980s. Undoubtedly, each of these factors played a role but they do not
sufficiently explain the political reasons which influenced Coloured consciousness during the elections.
It will be argued here that these are the factors which the movement must confront if it to prevent a
recurrence of the NP's victory in the Western Cape in the future. At the same time a frank recognition
of the shortcomings, political and organisational, is necessary to equip the movement to deal
effectively with the NP's rule in the Western Cape.
This paper is divided into two sections: the first section deals with the actual election campaign in
Newclare, a Coloured area lying west of Johannesburg; the second section will discuss some of the
issues which have been raised by ANC activists in their analysis of the outcome of the elections. The
formulations and conclusions put forward here are of course my own.
A. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN NEWCLARE
The first stage: October to December 1993
From the outset ANC activists recognised that the Coloured communities would be among the most
hotly contested areas of the elections. The ANC and NP were assured of majority support from
Africans and whites respectively. However, in order to prove their "multi-racial" character it was
necessary for both parties to show substantial support in the Coloured and Indian communities. For
the NP this was a matter of survival - in order to give any credence to its "new" image, support from
non-whites was absolutely vital. Little wonder therefore that a large part of its election campaign
concentrated on winning votes in these areas, primarily in the Western Cape. Its campaign was run
largely via the media, in contrast to the ANC's campaign which had at its core regular door-to-door
canvassing in the community. In this respect the election work in Newclare was typical of the ANC's
election campaign in most other Coloured areas.
In this paper the Newclare area refers to those areas which are covered by the ANC Newclare branch.
These are the Newclare, Waterval Flats (an estate built in the mid 1980s), Westbury, Coronationville,
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 Bosmorit and an African municipal hostel (Anthea) in Industria. Bosmont and Coronationville are the
two middle class communities, the former being regarded as one of the main Coloured middle class
areas in Johannesburg and the latter consisting largely of older people. Westbury and Newclare are
predominantly working class areas, where overcrowding, unemployment and general poverty are all
pervasive. Westbury is widely known as the drug centre of Johannesburg, with at least two major
gangs operating there, much like the mafia. Over the last two years there has been a massive increase
in gang-related crime and it was not unusual for us to come across youth brandishing weapons during
our electioneering. These areas also formed part of the old Western Areas township. In fact Westbury
is commonly referred to by its residents as "Western" and many take pride in calling it a township.
Some older residents lived in the Western Areas township and many of them speak an African
language. Some of them were ANC members in the 1950s and have clear recollections of the struggles
against the removals. Most of our work was concentrated in the working class sections, primarily
because this is where the majority of the people reside.
Our election campaign started off with a mass meeting at the beginning of October 1993. The work
involved in preparing for this meeting set the tone for the next seven months, with activists
campaigning every day for two to three weeks. Every household was covered at least twice with an
assortment of ANC pamphlets being handed out. Our main drawcard was that Nelson Mandela was
due to speak at the meeting, and as a result over 1000 attended. Very few activists could recall when
last such a big political gathering took place in this area. Whilst some of those who attended did so
out of curiosity, the overwhelming majority were clearly ANC supporters. This was at least shown by
the fact that more than 100 people signed up to join the ANC that night. However, this success was
dampened when we were informed, a few hours before the event, by Mandela himself that he would
not be able to attend. Even though Walter Sisulu, Tokyo Sexwale and a host of other regional and
national leaders attended, it did not make up for the absence of Mandela. For weeks we were accused
of lying to the community, and even a personal letter of apology from Mandela, which was distributed
to every household, did not take away the suspicions. Some activists reported that people were
accusing Mandela of not caring about the Coloureds. It also dampened the spirit of activists, and for
a while it was difficult to hold together the core who had campaigned so hard for the mass meeting.
However, their enthusiasm was reignited when an NP public meeting, held three few weeks after ours,
attracted no more than sixty people, twenty of whom were ANC members who went there to ask
questions. Other than a continuous tirade against the ANC, Jac Rabie failed to enthuse the small
gathering and was forced to entertain them with a rendition of Daar kom die Alabama. ANC activists
were in high spirits again, confident that we would easily win in our area.
Nevertheless, throughout October and November we canvassed the area on a regular basis, armed with
street sheets and ANC propaganda material. Virtually every night and most weekends were taken up
in this way. An analysis of street sheets revealed that approximately 40% of people canvassed
indicated support for the ANC, less than 20% said they would vote NP and the rest were not prepared
to commit themselves. The large percentage of undecided Coloured voters was confirmed by an
analysis of street sheets in Eldorado Park, and other Coloured areas. Although one needs to take into
account that some of the "undecided" group were NP supporters, unwilling to reveal their allegiance
to ANC canvassers, the results of the street sheets were probably an accurate indication of Coloured
consciousness at this stage. It also appeared then that many people in our area were simply not
interested in the elections, as if they were uncertain whether it really affected their lives or not.
The uncertainty that pervaded the Coloured population was a reflection of the dilemma faced by them:
to vote for black majority rule or not. Those who had made their minds up to vote ANC were
prepared to declare this openly. Most NP supporters, and those among the undecided group who were
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tending towards the NP, found it very difficult to justify their position at this stage. They understood
that a vote for that patty would mean supporting the people responsible for the miserable conditions
which they live in. Support for the NP was not something to be proud of, at least not for the majority.
An NP supporting woman was asked why she supported the party of apartheid and replied: "Ek weet
van die NP. se dade, maar ek het mos nie 'n keuse nie. Ek kan nie vir 'n swart mens stem nie." She
did not have anything positive to say about the NP and expressed the hope that there would be peace
between the people after the elections. One activist explained the attitude of those Coloureds who
would vote NP as follows: "They know the NP is a stinking, rotten rat. The only reason why they are
voting for the NP is their hatred for the ANC. But they will go to the polling booth with their noses
closed as they vote NP."
Coloured people's opinions were strongly influenced by the media, especially television. In this respect
the NP had the upperhand in the propaganda war to win Coloured voters. For many years people have
been fed a strong anti-ANC diet over the airwaves and this carried on, albeit in more subtle ways,
right up to the elections. Thus ordinary people invariably referred to things they had seen on television
when we discussed with them. They were particularly influenced in this way on matters such as
violence, religion, affirmative action and the "new" image of the NP and De Klerk. ANC activists
found it extremely difficult to counter the propaganda churned out by the SABC.
A distinct group that we came across regularly during canvassing were those who insisted that they
would note vote for any party but would only "vote for Jesus". These people could generally be
divided into two groups: the first were those who genuinely believed that they should not partake in
politics, and secondly there were those who were sympathetic to the NP and wanted to "catch out"
ANC members on the question of religion. Initially we spent a considerable amount of time trying to
persuade them of the necessity to "create paradise on earth", but the true-believers invariably used the
opportunity to preach to our activists about the evils of politics. Rather than spend our time arguing
with these people we made a conscious effort to win over the undecided voters, which meant in
practice covering between 60-80% of the area.
It should be noted here that a frequent debate in the branch during this period was over the use of the
term Coloured. Without wanting to oversimplify the division on this issue, it was interesting that
middle class activists were far more concerned that we should reject the apartheid label of Coloured.
Westbury and Newclare activists, on the other hand, whilst being conscious of the need to be
politically correct (whatever it means on this issue) spoke of "ons tnense" or "ons nasie" quite
naturally. It was agreed by most that while we should reject racist labels, it was also the case that
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many Coloured people, if not the majority, recognised themselves as a distinct group. Everyone also
admitted that the election campaign in the Coloured areas could not merely be a replication of the
campaign in the African townships. It was argued that "we have to understand the special conditions
faced by our people, and address their specific fears." At a regional level the ANC attempted to do
this with the formation of a "Special Task Force for minority areas".
This did of course not preclude the necessity of pointing out the common oppression and exploitation
experienced by the majority of Coloureds and Africans. Indeed it was always regarded as absolutely
vital that we should raise the common "class issues" and show to Coloured working people how their
destiny was tied up with that of their African counterparts. Thus a significant part of our agitation and
propaganda concentrated on highlighting the social issues, eg., housing, unemployment and low wages.
During the course of 1993 the ANC branch also played an important role in the teacher strike and in
an anti-crime campaign. These gave us ample opportunity to hammer the NP on the social issues with
some measure of success.
The Newclare ANC branch ended its 1993 campaign with a fairly successful fete. Most of our
members remained confident about our prospects in the elections. Up to that point there was little
evidence that the NP was making much effort to campaign in the area. In November we had also set
up an elections office and employed a full-time organiser. In the first few weeks after this more than
one hundred people came to the office to sign up. However, we still found that in spite of all the work
we had done since October the majority of people remained undecided. This only begun to change
significantly two to three weeks before the elections.
The second phase: January to May 1994
The ANC branch started off its campaign in 1994 with a series of Peoples' Forums in the different
areas. Our aims were to get Coloured people to put forward their demands to the ANC and to do some
voter education. For six weeks we worked flat out campaigning for these forums with door-to-door
visits and weekly sessions of covering the area with posters. Two of these forums, held in Westbury
and Bosmont, were very poorly attended even though they were well canvassed for. The forum held
at the Waterval Flats was attended by about 2-300 hundred people and was addressed by Tokyo
Sexwale. However, most of those who attended were ANC supporters which meant that were not
reaching those were still undecided, other than through house visits. The poor attendance at these
forums gave us some indication that support for the ANC could no longer be taken for granted. From
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the beginning of February we were constantly aware of the time constraints, and realised that we
would not be able properly to cover the area with door-to-door canvassing. A proper house visit often
took between 10 and 20 minutes.
It was also at this time that a statement by Mandela about Coloureds voting for the NP was widely
interpreted as him calling all Coloureds traitors. For about two weeks we had to put out the flames
of this issue with some people saying that this confirmed their fears that "when the blacks take over
they will go for the Coloureds first".
It seemed around February/March that problems were mounting for the ANC. One aspect of this was
the conflict between various ANC branches in Coloured areas and the national leadership over the
alliance with the Labour Party (LP), and in particular the fact that at least three of their leaders were
on our party list. The debate on this is issue had reared its head at the Annual Conference of the
ANC's PWV region. The publication of the ANC's list, however, gave new life to the debate as
numerous ANC supporters openly voiced their objection to the inclusion of LP candidates. The
experience of our community with a leading LP member, Miley Richards, has been extremely
acrimonious. Throughout the 1980s he was a prominent figure in the Tricameral system and there were
many clashes between him and the various community organisations. Besides the political arguments
against having such a questionable character on the ANC list, the majority of activists found it
extremely difficult to come to terms with the idea of campaigning for the likes of Miley Richards to
be elected to parliament. In fact, after the publication of the list the local ANC office was inundated
with calls from people raising their objections and some even threatened to resign from the ANC,
including executive members. We petitioned the Regional and National Executives on this issue to no
avail. Although we were able to regroup activists, this matter came back to haunt us throughout the
rest of the campaign.
The biggest shock experienced by the ANC branch was the success of the NP meeting held three
weeks before the elections. An estimated 1200 people attended, and even though people were bussed
in from other Coloured areas the majority came from Newclare, Westbury and Coronationville. It
seemed as if politics was suddenly transformed in our area, as the confidence of NP members was
bolstered. Overnight people put NP posters on their walls and proudly stated their intention to vote
NP. The weekend after the NP meeting we canvassed the area for a public meeting in Westbury, and
were shocked by the response. For the first time there was open antagonism towards us and it felt as
if we had been thrown back into the 1980s when supporters of the tricameral parties threatened to beat
up anti-election activists. Women and children were walking around with NP scarves and flags. One
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old woman followed our canvassers shouting pro-NP slogans. Another said she would never vote for
Mandela because "hy het tronk toe gegaan vir so lank om van ons taxes te lewe" (he went to prison
for so long to live off our taxes) Two old men tore up our pamphlets and expressed the kind of open
racism we had not experienced up to that point, saying they would never want to be ruled by "stupid
kaffiis".
The extent of NP support became clearer in our canvassing in one section of Bosmont where, in a
single night, we found 26 out of 30 households supporting the NP. A youth from this area said that
he would vote for the NP because he supports segregation and "on top of it my family has lived a very
comfortable life under the NP."
Attempts to convince people like this that voting for the NP would be wrong invariably tailed, even
though few of them could provide cogent reasons for supporting the NP. We found that most NP
supporters expressed their political thoughts primarily by attacking the ANC, eg., "blacks can't rule,
see how they messed up the rest of Africa", "since Mandela was released there has been a massive
increase in crime and violence, so the ANC must be behind the violence", "if the blacks rule this
country the violence between the Xhosa and Zulu will spread to the whole country". Violence and the
fear of chaos were key factors in Coloured consciousness and explanations about state collusion with
Inkatha or their direct involvement in violence did not have much impact with those who believed
otherwise.
Many of the previously unspoken fears now came to the fore. Old people asked us whether it was true
that the ANC would take away pensions. We only discovered a week before the elections that NP
supporters responsible for pension pay-outs had been spreading this rumour, warning the aged that
they would only keep their pensions if they voted for the NP. The unemployed suddenly discovered
that as Coloureds they "will never get a job because of affirmative action". On the one hand the
surfacing of these issues was positive as it allowed us to focus our political propaganda. But we found
it extremely difficult to breakdown the fear which seemed to grip many people. Nevertheless, in the
last two weeks we tried to cover the whole area again in a last attempt to secure votes for the ANC.
Our election campaign was rounded off with a successful public meeting in the heart of Westbury,
where a few hundred people openly declared their loyalty to the ANC.
Up to the time of the NP meeting it was difficult to assess how most people would vote. Whilst we
knew that many people supported the NP, several leading activists were nevertheless shocked by the
turnout at their meeting. From that point the majority of people we came across had made up their
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minds who they would vote for. It seems that with NP supporters publicly declaring their allegiance,
the rest of the community quickly identified themselves with their respective parties. There was also
a growing feeling that Coloureds had to make it known where they stood, so that the situation changed
very rapidly from one where most professed to be undecided to one where the community was split
right down the middle. Cape Town activists report a similar development in their areas, with some
believing that many people only decided on the day of the elections how they would vote. Bellville
activists say that they know of people who attended the last ANC rally in Athlone, shouting pro-ANC
slogans, and still voted NP. In those last three weeks ANC supporters came to our office saying they
were shocked to discover that their neighbours supported the NP or they could not believe that a long-
time friend could vote for the enemy.
Election Week
The week before the elections was marked by feverish activity to set into place the machinery to
oversee the process. ANC members were required to monitor polling stations and to roam the area to
check on the activity of other parties. Transport for ANC voters had to be organised. Security and
catering for all members out in the field had to be provided. Lastly, about 10 people operated from
the office, co-ordinating all the above activities, liaising with the sub-regional and regional offices, and
attending to the numerous complaints about voting irregularities. On all three days of the elections we
had people streaming into the office wanting voter's cards. Between SO and 60 people were actively
involved in some aspect of the elections. In addition a large percentage of IEC officials were also
ANC members.
From the time that the first polling station was set up on April 26 to the count of the last vote at
Nasrec on May 2 many ANC activists worked between 12 and 20 hours a day. On the election days
we had people guarding the ballot boxes at the police station, where they were kept overnight. It
would require a whole book to do justice to the superhuman effort put in by activists and volunteers.
Without their contribution in that week the ANC's election campaign was in danger of floundering.
Their enthusiasm and commitment easily made up for the movement's inexperience in elections.
There was a massive turnout on April 27, and to our surprise there was little antagonism between
ANC and NP supporters.
The excitement of election day has been covered adequately in the media. Suffice to say that every
activist came back from the polling station with a heart-rendering story of what it was like to vote for
the first time. Many tears of joy were shed openly by young and old. Ordinary people came to the
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local ANC office throughout the day exclaiming their excitement. Others just drove past the office
shouting "Amandla! We are free at last!"
From the April 29 to May 2, scores of ANC activists monitored the counting process at Nasrec for
between 12 and 15 hours a day. From the time we arrived there it became apparent that the NP and
DP were determined to stall the process, complaining about everything under the sun. Even white
enumerators who admitted to voting NP were embarrassed by the arrogance and rudeness of these
party official. Nonetheless, by the evening of May 2 everyone was ready to celebrate the ANC's
victory. When Mandela made his victory speech there was tremendous jubilation as people partied and
took to the streets. It seems that there was a collective sigh from activists that it was all over.
The figures below are the best estimates available for the outcome in our areas. They were compiled
from the information received by ANC members who monitored at the counting centre.
Hostel
Bosmont
Coronation
Newclare
Westbury
ANC
85%
55%
20%
58%
55%
NP
-
40%
75%
40%
45%
Inkatha
10%
-
-
-
-
Other
5%
5%
5%
2%
-
The category "other" includes the parties not mentioned above plus spoiled ballots. If one excludes
the figures for the hostel then it is apparent that the Coloured community was polarised between
support for the ANC and NP. Without the exact figures for the number of voters it is impossible to
translate these percentages into actual numbers. However, based on the fact that Westbury and
Newclare have the biggest populations, followed by Bosmont and then Coronationville, it is safe to
conclude that the outcome was probably a tie between the ANC and NP. Riverlea, a Coloured area
close to ours achieved a clear ANC majority, and in Eldorado Park it seems that the ANC managed
a narrow victory. There are some Coloured areas in the Transvaal which would probably have been
won by the NP. However, the outcome of the elections in Transvaal's Coloured areas has been
overshadowed by the enormous support for the NP in the Western Cape. From the time that the first
results from the Western Cape were made public activists have been embroiled in debate to get to the
bottom of the Coloured support for the NP. The next section of this paper will discuss some of these
issues.
B. WHY DID COLOUREDS VOTE NP?
The significance of the elections
An analysis of the reasons behind the support of Coloureds for the NP must necessarily start from an
understanding of the significance of the country's first democratic elections. April 27 was the day on
which the political emancipation of the African majority was formally registered. The elections
represented the gate through which the whole country had to pass, leaving behind it the abhorrent
system of apartheid and bringing into being the country's first democratically elected government.
Black majority rule was the inevitable consequence of the process unleashed by the release of Nelson
Mandela in 1990. This transformation was managed from the top (primarily by the ANC and NP) over
the last four years to avoid the perception among the masses that there was to be a rupture with the
past. However, this was only partially successful because the shift from white minority rule to a
majority black government has had a profound influence on the consciousness of the whole population.
The ANC leadership, especially Mandela, tried to make this reality as palatable as possible to the
minorities. For the whites the elections meant not only the end of their political hegemony but they
were also to be governed by the very people they had oppressed for so long. Nevertheless, the
majority had reconciled themselves to these realities by the time of the elections, even if they were
very apprehensive about it. Indians and Coloureds were also divided over their attitude to being ruled
by Africans. A large section regarded the end of white rule as their liberation. They saw themselves
as part of the oppressed and celebrated the victory of the ANC. But for others the spectre of black rule
meant changing one form of domination for another. They chose not identify themselves with the
liberation of the African majority.
Thus the fundamental question faced by the whole population on April 27 was "for or against black
rule". Every other issue was secondary. For the African population this was the day of liberation and
10
voting for the ANC was their way of bringing about that reality. On the other hand the majority of
whites, Coloureds and Indians decided to huddle together in an attempt to protect their privileges and
minimise the power of the new government. The anti-black rule and anti-ANC sentiments among the
Coloureds were therefore important in determining how they voted. The elections revealed clear racial
divides: Africans voted overwhelmingly for the ANC, whereas a majority of Coloureds, whites and
Indians voted for the NP. In Natal of course there was also to some extent an ethnic vote for the IFP.
Thus racial identity, and to a much lesser extent ethnic identity, were important in the outcome of the
elections.
Anti-ANC or pro-NP?
It would be a mistake to argue that the Coloured vote for the NP can only be described as an anti-
ANC vote. Certainly as election day approached there was an increase in the anti-ANC, anti-Aftican
sentiments among sections of the Coloureds, and as will be shown below there was a resurfacing of
racism. But many Coloureds also believed that the NP best represented their interests. In the two or
three weeks before the elections NP supporters in our area spoke more confidently and positively
about their support for that party. They referred most frequently to the integrity of De Klerk and the
"new" image of the NP. It was not surprising that De Klerk outstripped all other political leaders in
the popularity stakes in the Western Cape. Many people in our area said that they trusted him and
believed that it was as a result of his goodwill that Mandela was released. The ANC's poster
comparing De Klerk with previous NP rulers did not have a major impact because people believed that
he was really different.
Similarly, the image of the "new National Party" was very attractive to Coloured people. It was this
"purified" image of the leader and his party which convinced many Coloureds that they could feel
good about voting for the NP. A vote for the "new National Party" became something to be proud of
rather than an embarrassment as it was in the early parts of the campaign. Western Cape NP
supporters proudly displayed their T-shirts with slogans such as "De Klerk is my Here". However,
beyond this the key element in Coloured support for the NP was their belief that it would defend their
interests and prevent the ANC from taking away their privileges. Few NP supporters could defend
their party's policies, and when we challenged local NP leaders to debate these issues they flatly
refused.
The NP's campaign in the main did not consist of convincing the electorate of its policies or
programme. On the contrary it lacked a programme which could compare with the Reconstruction and
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Development Programme (RDP) and focused its propaganda mainly on convincing the minorities to
vote for it as the party best capable of being a counterweight to the ANC. Its success in this regard
was a key factor in the failure of the Democratic Party.
This basic approach of the NP was also revealed in its attitude to the RDP. While forwarding its
habitual criticisms against the "communist" aspects of the RDP and warning against raising
expectations, the NP did not outrightly reject the ANC's programme. On the contrary, it indicated
general support for the aims of the RDP, but insisted that the demands contained in it could only be
met through its "free market policies". Its lack of a programme for social upliftment therefore did not
make a significant difference in the elections. For the minorities it was the party which would defend
their privileges. The NP also used certain aspects of the RDP to rouse the fears of the Coloured
people. One of these was affirmative action.
For many Coloured people affirmative action meant, in the words of an unemployed woman from
Waterval Flats, that "Die ANC gaan net agter hulle eie mense kyk. Ons Kleurlinge gaan weer
onderdruk word, net hierdie keer gaan dit swaarder wees omdat hule ons jobs weg gaan neem. Dit
gebeur al klaar oral. Jy apply vir 'n job dan vra hulle vir jou of jy African is." This notion was
widespread and our ANC branch and regional executive had to deal with numerous complaints of
racial discrimination by bosses against Coloureds seeking work, who claimed that the bosses told them
that it was ANC policy to promote African people. ANC attempts to rectify this distortion had only
a limited effect. Affirmative action was now blamed by some for the high unemployment rate in
Coloured working class areas, and it appeared to them that the situation could only get worse with the
ANC in government. Another woman summed up her feelings on this issue by arguing that "At least
under the Nats we Coloureds could get jobs, now we are going to have nothing."
A similar attitude was expressed on the housing question. Over the last five years overcrowding has
become a major problem in all working class areas, including Westbury, Newclare and Waterval. Some
of the flats in these areas (consisting of one bedroom, kitchen, lounge and bathroom) have ten or more
people living in them. Many of the flats have extended families because children have nowhere to
move when they get married or have their own children. Two blocks of flats, built for pensioners, still
has no hot water. Virtually every household has rent or electricity arrears, and many people have been
threatened with evictions by the City Council and Management Committees. With these horrendous
conditions experienced by the majority of the people in our area, it was felt that we would be able to
convince them with the ANC's housing policy.
But the overwhelmingly positive response we expected did not materialise. Many of those who felt
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that the RDP was a good idea were also sceptical about whether any government could fulfil the kind
of promises made by the ANC. Others saw in this programme a confirmation that the ANC planned
to "look after its people". An old woman from Newclare who shares a flat with her children and
grandchildren told us, "I don't like it in my flat because it is cold and overcrowded. I pray all the time
that one of my children can make money and buy a house. But now this is all we have and I am
scared we are going to lose it. People say the ANC will come take our Coloured people's flats." This
was a common fear expressed by many.
Rumours abounded about how Mrs so-and-so saw a group of Africans walking through the area
pointing at the flats and houses which they wanted after the elections. In the middle class areas
domestic workers were accused of making plans to occupy their employers' houses after the elections.
The occupation of houses by African squatters in Cape Town and Durban only added fuel to fire on
this issue. At a certain stage we did not want our African comrades to walk alone in the area fearing
that they may be attacked by people. An old man, who said that he would vote NP but respected what
we were doing, tried to explain to us how "my people think": "It is not that they dislike blacks. But
you youngsters must understand we have dignity. Our places are small but we try to make it a home
for us. We cannot live in shacks. The white man has done many wrong things but at least we have
a roof over our heads."
Many activists were genuinely taken aback by the fact that Coloured people seemed satisfied with their
miserable conditions. This was however far from the truth. Poor Coloured people despise their living
conditions but many feared that they would lose what little they had to a black government. There was
particularly a recognition that Coloureds had privileges which placed them in a better position in
relation to the African majority, and these were granted to them by the white government. While
virtually no one opposed the aims of the RDP, the question that arose in the minds of many Coloureds
was not what they would gain from the RDP, but what they would have to give up for it. This made
it difficult to convince people that a new government would mean "a better life for all". During our
canvassing we distributed the ANC's Election Manifesto to every household and focused our
discussions with people on its contents. While there were some people who told us that as far they
were concerned "things can only get better", others said that they would not be convinced that
Coloureds would benefit from the RDP.
During the course of the campaign these fears gave rise to racism and even hostility towards Africans.
This was undoubtedly, enhanced by events such as the rape of Coloured woman by African youth in
Cape Town. So too did the NP's suggestion that the notorious "station strangler" may speak an African
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language and the police identikit (used in an NP pamphlet) made the killer look decidedly African.
The NP used its "swart gevaar" ticket amongst Coloured* with its racist pamphlet. Terms such as
"kaffir", "boetie" and "darkie" were openly used again. Activists found that the majority of those
Coloureds who had turned to racism were people who could not otherwise defend their support for
theNP.
The resurfacing of racism amongst sections of the Coloureds and their support for the architects of
Apartheid appeared incongruous with the role that Coloured people played, especially in the Western
Cape, in the uprisings of the 1980s. It must be remembered that in the 1989 election only about 1%
of Mitchells Plain's residents voted. Indeed the boycott by the majority of Coloureds of the Tricameral
elections was an important contributing factor in the downfall of P.W. Botha's schemes.
The 1980s, and before
From the late 1970s large sections of Coloured workers and youth put their weight behind the
liberation movement. The struggles of Western Cape students and youth from 1980 captured the
imagination of the whole working class. Coloured communities in Cape Town played a pioneering role
in the birth of the Civic movement and of course the United Democratic Front was launched in
Mitchells Plain in 1984. An increasing number of Coloured workers also started joining the
independent unions from the mid-1980s and this reached a high point with the amalgamation of the
Garment and Allied Workers' Union and Actwusa to form Sactwu in 1989. This was undoubtedly a
major advance in uniting African and Coloured workers on the shopfloor, and went some way in
removing the suspicion by African workers that Coloured workers were sell-outs. The 1980s thus
witnessed a greater unity between African and Coloured in their struggle against the white government
and the bosses. The violent suppression of popular struggles, such as the Trojan Horse killing in
Athlone, also made many Coloureds more sympathetic to the struggle. It seemed at the height of the
uprising in the mid to late 1980s that the attempts by the white regime to entrench divisions between
African and Coloured were being successfully thwarted.
But as any activists involved in these movements will attest it was never easy to mobilise the Coloured
population at large into political activity. Even at the time when many Coloured areas were burning,
many of them remained aloof and unwilling to throw their lot in with the movement. Nevertheless,
the 1980s were extraordinary times and few were prepared to openly oppose the liberation movement
and most were probably sympathetic to its aims. Those who sided with the regime were castigated and
became outcasts in their communities. As long as the enemy was clearly identifiable in the form of
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the white regime, the tendency towards greater unity amongst the oppressed predominated. However,
the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Mandela changed all of that. As the negotiations process
unfolded it dawned on an increasing number of people that the coming to power of a majority black
government was inevitable. Once this fact started seeping into consciousness cracks started to re-
emerge within the ranks of the oppressed, and a re-alignment of political allegiances started taking
shape.
There are of course also historical precedents of Coloured support for white parties against Africans.
In the 1920s the Nationalist under Hertzog campaigned for Coloured support by promising them a
"New Deal" which would give them a share in some of the privileges legislated for white workers and
exempt them from the restriction imposed on African workers.' Hertzog's appeal included the argument
that Coloureds had more in common with whites than Africans and it appears that many Coloureds
eligible to vote supported Hertzog's party. Similarly, in 1948 the NP appealed for Coloured support
in the elections to stop the "swart gevaar". Again sections of the Coloured electorate supported this
party. The fundamental basis of this support, in 1924 and 1948, was the idea that Coloured privileges,
however limited in comparison with the whites, would be protected from the African majority by these
white parties. For many Coloureds it was crucial not to be lumped with African, and thereby be
stripped of their limited privileges which distinguished and placed them above the African population.
The Hertzog and Malan governments failed to fulfil their promises to the Coloureds. Hertzog broke
his promise of the New Deal and the Malan regime applied its discriminatory laws against the
Coloureds as well. They were removed from the common voters' roll and thousands of Coloured
families suffered the indignity of forced removals from areas such as District Six, Claremont and
Sophiatown. They were shoved into racially exclusive apartheid areas with generally bad living
conditions. But Coloureds also derived some benefit from apartheid policies, primarily in the Western
Cape.
The Coloured Labour Preference policy of the National Party protected Coloured workers from
competition by lower paid African workers in the Western Cape. They occupied most of the artisan's
posts, semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Coloured workers have thus dominated the clothing, building
and food industries. The majority of unskilled council workers are Coloured, and at companies like
1
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Sanlam there are only a handful of African employees. It was primarily this reason why it was so
difficult to win Coloured workers to the independent unions until the mid-1980s. Privileges for
Coloureds were not confined to employment. Their residential areas were in a generally better state
than African townships, with brick houses, electricity and running water. Therefore, Coloureds in the
Western Cape were relatively privileged in comparison to the African population. This is why it was
not uncommon during the election campaign to find people saying that the privileges they have was
given to them by the whites.
Regional differences
The overwhelming support won by the NP from Coloureds in the Western Cape was not replicated
to the same extent in other regions. As mentioned above the figures available from the Transvaal
indicate an even split between the NP and the ANC. In the Northern Cape, where Coloureds are also
a majority, the ANC defeated the NP, and reports from the Eastern Cape suggest that a majority of
Coloureds voted ANC. It is clear therefore that there were important regional differences which
affected the Coloured vote.
In the Western Cape there is a deep-rooted feeling that things are very different for the Coloureds.
They have enjoyed certain privileges, which separate them from the poorer African population, and
there is a greater affinity with the whites. The latter factor is enhanced by the more liberal character
of the white authorities in this region. White domination has not been as oppressive as in the Northern
Cape for example. So while most Coloureds would undoubtedly want to improve their lives, many of
them clearly expressed that they believed they would be better off under the whites than Africans. The
fact that they are the majority in the Western Cape gave Coloureds the confidence that, together with
the whites, they could prevent Africans from taking over there, and in this way protect their limited
privileges. Some people also expressed the idea that the Western Cape "is our region".
A key difference between the Coloureds in the Northern and Western Cape is the different relationship
they have with whites and Africans. The white authorities in the Northern Cape have been far more
rightwing and oppressive. On the farms Coloured and African workers suffer the same intolerable
conditions under the whip of rightwingers. Apartheid oppression has therefore been much starker there
than in the Western Cape and many people's experience of land dispossession is relatively recent.
These factors have created more favourable conditions for an alliance between Africans and Coloureds.
ANC members in the Northern Cape report that the majority of Coloureds in Kimberley and Upington
voted ANC, and that it is likely that this was repeated on the farms. The greater affinity between
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Colouteds and Africans in this region is partly reflected in the fact that many Coloureds speak Tswana.
In Cape Town Coloureds "share" Afrikaans with the whites, and the majority of them prefer reading
Die Burger to the Cape Times. This was of course another factor in the shaping of political attitudes
among Coloureds.
In the Eastern Cape the combination of being a very small minority of the population and a relatively
high percentage of unionisation among Coloured workers combined to ensure a majority Coloured
support for the ANC. This would probably also have been affected by the Labour Party's support for
the ANC, because this region has traditionally been a stronghold of the former.
The Alliance's campaign
Taking the above factors into account was it at all possible for the ANC and its allies to win the
majority of Coloured support, and thereby avert the defeat in the Western Cape? The ANC's campaign
undoubtedly suffered from a number of shortcomings brought about both by inexperience and
complacency on the one hand, and an often flawed political approach on the other. Our inexperience
in running election campaigns was not debilitating as it was more than made up for by the enthusiasm
of activists. However, the complacency which pervaded the whole movement was more of an obstacle.
Mandela's warning against complacency was not well heeded as everyone realised that a victory for
the ANC was a foregone conclusion. This was reinforced by opinion polls supporting the idea of a
massive victory for the ANC, with some predicting more than 70% support for the organisation. In
our area activists often complained that there was not sufficient urgency from the leadership in their
running of the campaign.
There has developed a feeling among some Coloured activists that the ANC leadership did not
concentrate a sufficient amount of attention on the Coloured electorate compared to what the NP did.
They argue that the leadership spent too much time preaching to the converted. There have also been
accusations that the influence which the UDF or Mass Democratic Movement commanded among the
Coloured population was squandered by the new, exile-dominated leadership. There may be some truth
in these but they fail to confront the real political weaknesses of the ANC in the election campaign.
These stem from the continuing "toenadering" between the ANC leadership and the NP on the one
hand, and between the ANC leadership and the big bosses on the other.
Undoubtedly the negotiated agreement to form a Government of National Unity, irrespective of the
outcome of the elections, inhibited the ANCs campaign. There was for example unhappiness with the
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television debate between Thabo Mbeki and Pik Botha, as activists felt that the former was "too nice"
and mostly indistinguishable from the deputy leader of the NP. The ANC's campaign against the NP
was generally tame and over-accommodating, whereas the NP went all out in raising the spectre of
the "swart gevaar". Little was done by the ANC to remind the Coloured population of all the
wrongdoings of the NP, something which would have been very easy to do. In Hemus Kriel there was
an easy target. As Minister of Police he was in charge at the time of the Umtata massacre and the
Goldstone revelations of gun-running. His department was also deeply involved in stoking violence
in Natal and the East Rand. In the four years since 1990 there have been numerous revelations of
corruption, involvement in murders and massive squandering of money at the highest level of
government. These were not taken advantage of by the ANC.
Instead it concentrated its campaign on convincing Coloureds that it was a "decent and peaceful" party.
This was partly necessary to counter decades of NP propaganda that the ANC was a bloodthirsty
organisation. But in doing this the ANC seemed to forget that an important part of any election
campaign is to politically demolish opposition parties in front of the electorate. The ANC thus failed
effectively to counter a crucial component of the NP campaign viz., that it was a "new" party, which
had apologised for its past sins and had embarked on a new road. The NP very cleverly pushed Kriel
into the background and let De Klerk be the frontrunner in the Western Cape and the ANC did little
to change this.
The republishing of a Vrye Weekblad article which quoted racist remarks by Marike de Klerk about
Coloureds had only a limited effect on Coloureds. Similarly, imaginative slogans such as "Vote NP
en bly 'n Hotnot" did not effectively counter the NP's racist campaign. Coloureds believed that De
Klerk was a changed man. After all, Mandela had consistently praised him as "a man of integrity".
The rapprochement between the ANC and NP made the former's campaign too accommodating and
stripped it of the political militancy required to tackle the NP.
In the same vein the ANC did not hammer the alliance between the bosses and the NP, which has
been responsible for the miserable conditions experienced by the Coloured working class. Coloured
workers, especially those organised in trade unions, are acutely aware of their exploitation by the
bosses. In the Western Cape thousands of clothing and textile workers have been retrenched over the
past three or four years, and farm workers on the outskirts of Cape Town continue to live under
terrible conditions. The rule of the bosses have been defended, very often with guns, by the NP. A
political attack on this alliance would have strengthened the ANC's campaign against the NP.
However, the leadership's accommodating stance towards the bosses made this virtually impossible.
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It has become apparent the important sections of the ANC leadership are unwilling to antagonise the
capitalists, and have quickly learnt the art of defending their economic interests.
"Cosatu the workers' voice, ANC the workers' choice" or "Your vote, your choice"?
From the start of the election campaign it was recognised in the Triple Alliance that Cosatu would
play a key role. With more than 1 million members, a strong organisation based on democratic factory
organisation, hundreds of experienced shop stewards and financial resources, it was bound to be an
important pillar in the campaign. This was indeed proven all over the country, including the Western
Cape, where Cosatu shop stewards organised weekly "blitzes" of the main Coloured residential areas.
This brilliant effort was partly undermined by the political approach taken by the Sactwu leadership
in the Western Cape. As the biggest union in the region, with the largest number of Coloured
members, this union had a pivotal role in influencing Coloured opinion. However, it chose to run its
election campaign under the slogan "your vote, your choice" and failed to challenge the political
affiliation of those workers who supported the NP. When questioned by shop stewards on this issue
the leadership argued that many members were NP supporters, and the union could therefore not
openly campaign for the ANC. While the union organised good voter education programmes it
generally steered clear of campaigning openly for the ANC, in spite of a Cosatu decision to do so. One
organiser said that the union's campaign had five stages, and only in the last of these would they urge
workers to vote ANC. There was a great deal of unhappiness among shop stewards who believed that
the union should have strongly advocated for an ANC vote. They also complained that in spite of a
verbal commitment to support the ANC's campaign the union did little at a factory level to put this
into practice.
Karel Swarts, a leading Sactwu shop steward in Bellville, explained how he and his fellow comrades
spent many hours openly campaigning for the ANC on the factory floor. As a result they succeeded
in convincing the majority of workers at their plant to vote ANC. He is convinced that if the union
did the same throughout the region that it would have made an important difference in the elections.
For him a key issue should have been the NP's opposition to strikes. Since 1989 many Coloured
workers have engaged in strike action to defend their rights. During the course of the elections
clothing workers were discussing strike action in support of their wage demand, creating an ideal
opportunity for the union to expose the position of the NP. Unfortunately, this was not done.
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The role of the union leadership was particularly important because of the "dual consciousness" of
many organised Coloured workers, i.e. of support for Cosalu and the NP. An important example of
this was of a group of textile workers who faced retrenchment a few months ago because the bosses
thought that they were too militant. The ANC branch in Bellville played a crucial role in mobilising
a successful campaign to defend their jobs. Yet, just before the elections some of them said that they
would vote NP. One of them explained that, "I will vote for the NP because it will look after the
Coloureds, but this is not goirg to stop from fighting the exploitation of the bosses." Many union
activists in Sactwu feel that a bold pro-ANC campaign by the union could have convinced workers
like this that the bosses who they were prepared to fight against have been the main backers of the
NP, and the latter their main defenders. The union leadership could have used their authority to
convince workers like this not to vote NP.
This is not to argue that the ANC would easily have won the majority of Coloured voters to its side.
The nature of the elections made this extremely difficult. However, by addressing some of the political
shortcomings of the election campaign it will be possible to undermine the NP's base among the
Coloured population.
Coloured party
At the beginning of 1993 a number of activists in the Western Cape raised the idea of launching a
Coloured party to attract Coloured voters away from the NP. Although this proposal did not gain much
support at the time, some activists have again raised whether such a tactic would not have prevented
an NP victory in the Western Cape. It must be remembered that this idea was mooted by Coloured
activists who felt that the ANC had sidelined many of the leading UDF activists and consequently lost
the support base which they had built in the Coloured communities. It was also argued by some of
them that a more radical party was needed to win Coloured support.
A shortcoming in the debate on this issue was that the proponents of a Coloured party did not clarify
what the programme of such a party should be. How different would its programme be from that of
the ANC? Unless such a party adopted a radically different programme from that of the ANC, and this
would be very unlikely, it would have been indistinguishable from the ANC in the eyes of the
electorate. It would have been regarded as a ruse to con Coloured voters, and from that point of view
alone would have further alienated Coloured voters from the ANC. Furthermore, when faced with two
parties which hold similar political positions voters invariably choose the stronger party. This would
particularly have been the case in the first all race elections which showed that smaller parties,
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appealing to particular constituencies, could not attract many voters. This was the fate of the different
Muslim parties in the Western Cape for example. Similarly, the formation of Malcolm Lupton's
National Liberation Front only succeeded in gathering a handful of rabidly racists behind it banner.
The other danger of such a formation is that it would have been viewed as a Coloured breakaway from
the ANC, thereby giving credence to the NP's propaganda that the ANC cannot address the needs of
the Coloured people. In this case the NP would have been the main beneficiary of such a move.
However, the main problem with the proposal for a separate Coloured party is that it would have
reinforced the racial propaganda of the NP that Coloureds have interests separate from the rest of the
oppressed and exploited. The majority of Coloureds are working class, experiencing exploitation in
much the same way as the rest of the working class. It is primarily on the basis of a class appeal that
Coloureds should be won over to the liberation movement. Any other approach, especially one based
on a racial appeal, would have entrenched racial divisions in the working class and only benefit the
ruling class. What may therefore have appeared as an advantageous short term tactic would have had
serious negative effects on the movement in the long term. The only effective way to overcome the
racial divisions in our society is by building on the non-racial working class unity which was forged
in the struggles of the 1980s.
Conclusion
The elections was a victory for the whole movement. The country has been rid of the shackles of
white oppression. For many Coloured activists this historic victory has been tainted by the victory of
the NP in the Western Cape. However, it would be wrong to jump to quick conclusions about the
Coloured people. The fact remains that a significant section did vote for the ANC and consciously
identified with the national liberation of the African majority. This is the foundation which needs to
be built on to secure non-racial unity.
In order to do this the liberation movement (however this may be defined in the future) must
necessarily confront the issues underlying the Coloured support for the NP in the elections. A key
question that needs to be addressed is whether it is possible for the NP to become the "traditional"
party of the Coloureds. It has undoubtedly built a base amongst Coloureds and will be determined to
hold onto this, and specifically secure its control of the Western Cape. If the ANC continues to be
perceived as the party for Africans, can the NP become the party of the minorities? Its performance
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in the elections suggests that there is some basis for this. If the NP succeeds the danger exists that the
racial divisions revealed in the elections could be entrenched. This must be prevented.
In the new South Africa racial domination has been removed, revealing more starkly the underlying
class divisions pervading our society. In future class struggles will come to play an even more
prominent role in the shaping of politics in the country. An early sign of the changes which are taking
place is the affiliation of 60 000 white workers to Cosatu.
It is hoped that this paper has given some insight to the consciousness of Coloureds during the
elections and in so doing have revealed the important aspects which influenced the way they voted.
Coloureds are not a homogeneous group, even though at times there appears to be a "common
identity". Class and political divisions run deep through their ranks. It is therefore important that they
are not all lumped together one side of the political divide. The elections represented, in a certain
sense, a snapshot of Coloured consciousness. Their future political allegiances are still to be
determined. The movement can prevent the majority of Coloureds from choosing the blind alley of
the NP. In the final analysis this can only be done through building working class unity across the
racial divide. The fears of black domination and losing privileges can in reality only be countered
successfully if the living standards of the all the people is raised. The full implementation of the RDP
can go a long way in ensuring this.
[ends]
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